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Main page » Polish armour » tankettes » part 4 – Polish artillery – Steel Panthers – what's new | ![]() | |
© Michal Derela, 2007 | Updated: 15. 9. 2024 |
Part I: Development, history & production --- Part II: Camouflage, description, specifications & modeling
Part III: Service with photo gallery --- Part IV: Tankettes with 20 mm cannons --- Self propelled guns
Part V: Experimental tankettes --- Part VI: Foreign service of TK/TKS --- Part VII: Auxiliary equipment --- TKS gallery
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A cannon-armed TKS, probably from the 51th Armoured Unit, lost on 1 September 1939 in Piasek village |
From among some 570 Polish tankettes, only a handful of TKS armed with 20 mm cannons were able to fight against enemy armour during Polish Campaign in September 1939. Unfortunately, their rearmament started too late and probably no more than two dozen of these vehicles entered service by the outbreak of World War II. With advantages, like small silhouette and agility, they appeared successful tank destroyers, and ones of most valuable Polish armoured vehicles. After last update, the page contains most up-to-date information on assignment and combat use of these vehicles, based upon newest research. Their use was popularized in the 21st century, unfortunately, unfairly reducing the collective effort of Polish tank crews to exaggerated exploits of a single famous soldier.
Development of Polish tankettes - in Part I; description, specifications and modelling - in Part II. Note: links inside a text without an underline are external, to Wikipedia articles.
Just as a production of Polish tankette TK (TK-3) was starting, it was realized, that the tankette armed with a standard 7.92 mm wz. 25 Hotchkiss machine gun can not efficiently fight against any armoured vehicles, and is able to fight manpower and soft vehicles only. The British had offered a light self-propelled gun with Vickers 47 mm gun as one of Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankette variants, so the Poles planned to build support tankettes with stronger armament as well. A development of Polish support tankettes went in two ways eventually. There was created a light self-propelled gun TKD with 47 mm wz. 25 Pocisk infantry gun, but only four experimental vehicles were built. On the other hand, there were trials of replacing a machine gun in a standard tankette with a big caliber machine gun or an autocannon.
Initially, it was planned to arm TK tankettes with French 13.2 mm wz. 30 Hotchkiss machine guns. According to one author, one TK-3 tankette was tested with the 13.2 mm MG mounted provisionally in an universal ball mounting[10]. Unfortunately, no photographs of such vehicle are known. Its armour penetration however appeared too low, and bullet dispersion was found too high, so it was abandoned in a favour of 20 mm cannon (the latter drawback – 60 cm dispersion on 100 m distance, was probably a matter of a provisional mounting only). Despite it, a small batch of 16 machine guns wz. 30 was bought in 1932 and they temporarilly armed Vickers E tanks. It should be however noted, that 13.2 mm machine gun, with its sticking out long bent forward magazine, would not fit under the tankette armour without a very complicated redesign – which might have been among reasons to abandon rearmament of tankettes, albeit not recorded in available documents.
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Solothurn cannon mounted in TKS (it can be distinguished from the FK-A by a shorter barrel, mounted lower in a smaller mantlet). |
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TKS tested with 37 mm wz. 18 Puteaux gun in 1936 (hauled by the 7TP tank prototype). |
It should be noted, that in 1936 there was also tested a TKS with a short-barrel French 37 mm SA Puteaux semi-automatic gun. The gun was mounted in a standard universal ball mounting in a place of a machine gun (more on a page about experimental self-propelled guns). It was World War I vintage weapon, best fit to fight machine gun nests, with poor armour penetration capability, therefore Polish Army was planning to get rid of this weapon and this project had no future. There exists a photo from tests, but other details are not known. It seems, that this might have been an useful support vehicle in tankette platoons, easy to produce, with basic anti-tank capabilities, but the idea was obviously abandoned (in practice, the Puteaux gun mounted in a handful of armoured cars wz. 29 appeared quite efficient against light tanks in 1939).
In 1937, Bolesław Jurek of Fabryka Karabinów (FK, Rifle Factory) in Warsaw constructed a recoil-operated 20 mm automatic cannon model A, also known in short as the FK-A. The model A offered slightly better armour penetration, than tested Oerlikon and Madsen cannons, and was evaluated as a better weapon for armoured weapons' needs. As a result, it was accepted under a designation: 20 mm wz. 38 (Pattern 1938) heaviest machine gun (Polish abbreviation: nkm). It was considered an interim weapon for armoured forces and infantry, until newer designs would be ready (first of all, gas-operated model C gun). In summer 1938 the first batch of 100 cannons was ordered. At the same time, in mid-1938 a prototype was tested on 4TP tank. Two pre-production cannons were delivered to the armoured weapons in late 1938. Strangely, it was first tested in January-February 1939 in a modified TK-3 (TK) tankette, which would need more changes to fit the weapon, than the TKS.
For tankette use, a Cardan mount was designed by Jerzy Napiórkowski, with a big hemispherical armoured mantlet (the barrel was fixed in the mantlet centrally in a vertical plane, offset to the left from a central point). Rearming of the TKS demanded relatively small changes in armour – a new front plate with a bigger weapon opening, new plates above the weapon, and enlarged rear part of a gunner's hatch, with a forward part of the hatch replaced by a fixed plate. The Gundlach reversible observation periscope had to be displaced to the left in a new lengthened fixed upper plate because of a bigger weapon (some tankettes were early series TKS, that had no periscope before). The gunner's hatch was therefore a bit smaller and opening rearwards only. There also changed positions of three thimbles for signal flags. Small changes had to be made to interior equipment, to accommodate racks for 15 five-round magazines; the sixteenth magazine could be loaded in the weapon. A notable detail was a removal of a redundant external anti-aircraft MG pivot mast on right hull side. Such modification of the TKS was worked out in February – March 1939. Since the tankettes had screwed armour, the modification could be proceeded with supplied parts in unit workshops, according to a manual from 22 June 1939. However, in order to save time, it was finally decided, that first batches should be rearmed at state-owned PZInż F1 (Ursus) car factory in Czechowice near Warsaw, instead of Experimental Workshops of Armoured Weapons' Technical Research Bureau (first 10 tankettes) and battalion workshops. A rearming of the TK-3 demanded more changes, described further. The cannon with a scope sight costed some 30,000 zlotys, the modification of the TKS costed some 4,000 zlotys, and of the TK-3 some 5,000 zlotys. Specifications of tankettes were similar to basic models, apart from slightly increased weight and full length (3285 mm).
Military authorities hesitated on how many tankettes should be rearmed, and plans changed several times from 1937, ranging from 1/3 of TK-3 and TKS tankettes to all of them. There were also doubts, if rearming of worn out TK-3s was purposeful at all. On 26 April 1939 the Armoured Weapons HQ expressed plans to rearm 100 TKS tankettes with the first series cannons, then rest of TKS (270), then TK-3 tankettes, provided, that funding would allow (about 570 in total). In late May 1939, the second batch of 100 guns was ordered, and it was finally decided to rearm 150 tankettes – 80 TKS and 70 TK-3, what was approximately 1/3 of combat-worthy vehicles.
At that time, in early 1939, a production of guns, barrels, ammunition, sights, mantlets and armoured plates was only starting, in different factories. As for cannon production, an offer of Zieleniewski firm was chosen, which is viewed as an error by some, because it was placed in a newly-built factory in Sanok, while the state-owned Fabryka Karabinów could have started production earlier. Probably it would not have changed the actual situation much, as there were also other parts needed to complete the vehicles. The first ten cannons of 100 ordered were delivered in May 1939, the next ten in July. According to an unverified account, around 55 guns were manufactured by the war outbreak. New armour plates were made by Baildon Steelworks in Katowice and Southern Works in Stalowa Wola starting only from mid-July. Mantlets of the first series were ordered from two manufacturers for comparison: Lilpop, Rau and Loewenstein in Warsaw (cast) and PZInż (forged).
On 4 May 1939 it was ordered to rearm first 10 tankettes TKS (selected only on 7 July), in early July – another 14 (from the 12th Armoured Battalion, rearmed with Renault R-35 tanks). First ten vehicles were completed in late July, probably all fourteen of the second batch – in August. On 14 August 1939 the order was extended for remaining 56 TKS and 70 TK-3. It was expected at that moment, that next eight TKS should be ready by "non-extendible date" of 30 August 1939, another eight TKS and sixteen TK-3 by 15 September 1939, and the rest gradually by January 1940. Despite these plans, there might have been delays, and in addition there are no documents found, whether specific TKS were ordered to be delivered for rearmament from Armoured Battalions, apart from initial 24. Some 55 cannons were produced by the war outbreak, but a number of complete modernization kits was lower (according to some documents, there were manufactured parts to rearm 40 tankettes). As a result, it is generally accepted, that only 24 TKS tankettes were rearmed before the war. There is no direct confirmation about completing all tankettes of the second series, and some authors write about 20 rearmed tankettes (apparently judging from a number of known completed guns), but there are no obstacles known to complete all in accordance with a schedule. There is no information, if any further vehicles were completed at the PZInż before or during first days of the war, which was theoretically possible, provided, that the tankettes had been assigned and delivered for rearming. As a matter of a fact, even up to 32 tankettes might have been rearmed, what is regarded as probable by J. Korbal[11].
Polish military authorities eventually decided to rearm a number of older TK-3 (TK) tankettes as well, in order to provide TK-equipped units with cannons without mixing equipment types, what complicated maintenance. As it was mentioned, already in the end of 1938, one TK-3 tankette was experimentally fitted with the FK-A cannon, with an addition of a front superstructure on the right side, before the commander-gunner. Its silhouette became similar to the TKS, but it had a longer superstructure, without a niche before the driver's head. The commander's post was also fitted with Gundlach reversible periscope, what improved his situation awareness (it demanded replacing a front part of a wide common roof hatch with two smaller individual hatches, while rear part remained common). In January 1939 this conversion was approved, and after a decision to rearm TK tankettes, an appropriate manual was worked out on 14 August 1939.
In late August the 1st, 5th and 8th Armoured Battalions were ordered to send four TK-3 each to Ursus works. It was first planned to rearm 16 tankettes TK-3 by 15 September 1939, but there is no evidence so far, that any were rearmed (some publications suggest, that three have been completed). They were supposed to equip Armoured Units nos. 71, 81, 51, 11, but first three received cannon-armed TKS eventually. In spite of numerous photographs taken by German soldiers, including more than half of cannon-armed TKS, there have been no cannon-armed TK revealed. The fate of the prototype is not known (the cannon might have been removed from it after testing the conversion). There is no mention in publications, if it was constructed of armoured steel or mild steel. The latter possibility seems more likely to us, as for the superstructure at least, but maybe for a whole hull (there was a batch of 15 early mild-steel TK made, used for training and experiments, and it is not known so far, which vehicle was used for conversion).
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TKS tankettes with cannons of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, after crossing Hungarian border. Note protective covers on mantlets and muzzles (it is not known if they were standard). Tankettes have dark rectangles painted(?) next to visors (their purpose is not known). See a wider scene |
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Abandoned TKS with a cannon upon Polski Fiat 621L truck (ordinary truck, not a special tank transporter). Evident is the truck's camouflage. [Courtesy of Ireneusz Zapaśnik from his collection] |
It was first planned to include five tankettes with cannons into a tankette squadron or company (of 13 tanks), but eventually on 2 June 1939 it was reduced to four (two per a platoon, without a company's commander tank, which less often took part in a direct combat, and his primary task was commanding). Commanders of peculiar armies wanted cannon-armed tankettes, and an assignment plan of the first series was changing in last weeks before the war, while a conversion process was on the way. There are lacks in documents, and that is why a part of details of their actual assignment and quantity are not sure. It should be kept in mind, that before the war, Polish armoured weapons were organized in armoured battalions, which were peacetime units only and were to mobilize other units in case of war. First of all, cannon-armed tankettes were to be given to mobilized battalion-size Armoured Units (aka Armoured Detachments – Dywizjon pancerny in Polish) of the cavalry. According to an initial plan from 21 June 1939, after two motorized bigades, they were to be given, in order, to Armoured Units nos: 71, 51, 81, 11, 91, 62, 61.
The biggest number of tankettes with cannons – eight, were assigned to the motorized 10th Cavalry Brigade (10.BK) of Colonel Stanisław Maczek: four tankettes in a squadron of the Brigade's reconnaissance unit (TKF-equipped) and four in the 101st Reconnaissance Tank Company (TKS-equipped). There are some doubts expressed, if the Brigade had all eight tankettes, or only four, but there were such orders issued, and there are no obstacles known[note 1]. There were plans to create additional tankette platoons in motorized regiments, increasing a total number of cannon-armed tankettes in both motorized brigades to 12, but it was not realized before the war.
Next eight vehicles were given to the second motorized brigade: Warsaw Armoured-Motorized Brigade (WBPM), but since it was under organization at that time, shortly before the war – on 23 August 1939 it was ordered to pass its cannon-armed TKS to the 1st and the 8th Armoured Battalions in Poznań and Bydgoszcz, for units which were to be mobilized sooner. It was planned, that the WBPM would receive new ones by 5 September, but basing upon reports it is assumed, that it received only four cannon-armed tankettes eventually. Probably two were given to its 11th Reconnaissance Tank Company and two to its reconnaissance unit. It can not be excluded however, that the brigade received all eight, while the technical officer of the reconnaissance unit claimed it got six canon-armed TKS[11].
Four TKS tankettes with cannons (ex-WBPM ones) were assigned to tankette squadrons of the 71st Armoured Unit of Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade and the 81st Armoured Unit of Pomorska (Pomeranian) Cavalry Brigade, mobilized by the 1st and the 8th Armoured Battalions respectively. Both units were TK-equipped, so a rule of not mixing equipment was breached. Many sources claim, that the 81st Unit had only three tankettes with cannons, which is a half truth, because one of four tankettes assigned broke down.
There is no official information on last four tankettes of the first series and possible further ones. However, according to a modified plan, after equipping motorized brigades with 16 tankettes, remaining 8 TKS from the second batch were to be given to the 62nd Armoured Unit of Podolska Cavalry Brigade and the 91st Armoured Unit of Nowogródzka Cavalry Brigade, mobilized by the 6th and 4th Armoured Battalions respectively. Documents suggest, that these battalions indeed received cannon-armed tankettes in early August[4], but there is no proof, that these two units had them in September 1939. However, J. Korbal came up with a thesis, based upon photographs, that two or four tankettes were given to the 61st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company, also mobilized by the 6th Battalion, what is in part consistent with the information above[11]. It must have been an exception from a rule of equipping cavalry units with cannon-armed tankettes first[note 2].
There are no documents, but now we can say for sure, that cannon-armed TKS were given to the 51st Armoured Unit of Krakowska (Cracov) Cavalry Brigade (TK-equipped)[11]. Its mother 5th Armoured Battalion was ordered to send four TK-3 for rearmament by 28 August. It received at least two TKS with cannons, but probably it was a standard number of four such tankettes. We indicated such possibility from 2018 update, since such vehicle was identified on a photo on the unit's combat track (see further).
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A cannon-armed TKS captured by the Germans after a fall of Warsaw (possibly the one of Edmund Roman Orlik, from the 71st Armoured Unit) |
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German captured two TKS and two TK-3 (with an unidentified unit sign of an arm with a sword). Vehicles probably come from the 71st Armoured Unit, left disarmed in Kampinos Forest without a fuel. |
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A burned cannon-armed TKS in an unidentified place. |
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↑↑ An unidentified abandoned cannon-armed TKS, possibly from the 61st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company. A purpose of a dark rectangle next to a driver's visor is not clear (unit sign?). |
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↑↓ TKS tankettes gathered after a battle of Tomaszów Lubelski, probably on Bełżec station. The first on the right is cannon-armed. |
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The TKS from the 51st Armoured Unit abandoned in Gózd near Kielce (more below). |
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The vehicles gathered after a fall of Warsaw – visible are probably three cannon-armed TKS, including one wihout a mantlet cover (the one on the photo in the beginning of a chapter is the 4th from right). |
Cannon-armed tankettes were actively used during the German invasion in September 1939, but there is no specific information on usage of most of them. Only actions of the 71st Armoured Unit, assigned to the Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade of Poznań Army, fighting in western and central Poland, are relatively well known – although there are significant discrepancies when it comes to details. During first two weeks the unit apparently had no encounters with enemy armour, although it was in action since 1 September. On 9 September the unit acquired another cannon-armed TKS, found in a railway transport at Jackowice station (probably belonging to the 81st Unit). According to an account, this tankette was repaired and joined the unit[note 3]. The first encounter with enemy armour was apparently on 14 September 1939, when tankettes were supporting an attack of the 7th Mounted Rifles Regiment on Brochów (on the Bzura river, east of Warsaw), during the battle of the Bzura. Its cannon-armed tankettes disabled at least three German tanks of the 4th Panzer Division then and helped to capture the village. There are, however, conflicting versions on how many Polish tankettes participated, and who fired at German tanks[note 4a].
The most famous action took place on 18 September near Pociecha village in the Kampinos Forest (east of Warsaw). A platoon of three cannon-armed TKS of the 71st Unit was assigned to the 15th Uhlan Regiment, acting in a vanguard of the brigade, withdrawing towards Warsaw. Polish forces encountered a platoon of three German tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment of the 1st Leichte Division near a forest crossroads. Tankettes disabled or burned all three tanks PzKpfw 35(t), without losses. There was killed a commander of the 2nd platoon of the 2nd company Leutnant prince Victor Albrecht von Ratibor and 8 other crewmen, according to a German account. A detailed course of the skirmish remains unclear, however. There is a popular myth, that all tanks were destroyed by a sole cannon-armed tankette, manned by Edmund Roman Orlik, and the remaining tankettes were MG-armed. It originated from vivid articles written by J. Magnuski in 1970s, basing upon Orlik's story, but his original account is not known. In fact, there are more credible detailed accounts, supported by more evidence, that there were three cannon-armed tankettes on the Polish side, and a major role was played by Władysław Tritt, who was awarded for his actions post-war. Moreover, there are other accounts indicating a presence of Polish uhlans with 37 mm anti tank gun and anti tank rifles. Orlik might have participated in this action as well, but it is not sure[note 4b]. There is also popular misunderstanding, that one of destroyed tanks was PzKpfw IV B, but that tank was destroyed next day. According to reports, unfortunately, after this action the three TKS had to be disarmed and abandoned due to a lack of fuel.
On the next day 19 September, Polish cavalry defended nearby Sieraków village in Kampinos Forest against tanks of the 1st Leichte Division. The Germans suffered substantial losses from the Polish defence (according to Polish reports, some 20 tanks), but first of all due to anti-tank and field artillery fire. Among others, there was killed Hauptmann von Kriegsheim, a company commander of the 65th Pz.Abt. According to Orlik's account, there remained one cannon-armed TKS and two TK-3, and they took part in the battle – but there is not an independent confirmation. According to him, Orlik carried out short raids from earth pits and back, to the left flank of advancing Germans, and claimed to have disabled seven tanks, what is difficult to confirm[note 4c].
At least two surviving cannon-armed tankettes of the 71st Unit got through to besieged Warsaw on 20 September or following days, and took part in its defence, this time without encounters with enemy armour (see below). Last tankettes of the 1st platoon were kept in working order thanks to a fuel recovered from wrecked German vehicles at that time.
It should be noted, that the 71st Armoured Unit fought from the first day of World War II, initially in area of Leszno. Its commander was Major Kazimierz Żółkiewicz, and tankette squadron commander was Lt. Wacław Chłopik. On 2 September 1939 it supported Polish troops in a short raid to the German territory, and its tankettes were fighting against Grenzwacht units in Geyersdorf village. From 7 September the unit took part in a battle of the Bzura River, in an area around Łęczyca, Zduny and Głowno. W. Tritt reported on firing at German motorized column, defending an approach to a bridge on the Słudwia along with two wz. 34 armoured cars with 37 mm cannons around 7 September.
There is not much specific information on actions of cannon-armed tankettes in other units. Tankettes of the 81st Armoured Unit fought in "Pomeranian corridor" in the north. The Unit had only three TKS with cannons, because according to its commander Major Franciszek Szystowski, the fourth TKS got broken (without further details) before the war and was sent for repairs in Włocławek[11]. On 1 September its tankettes acted near Chojnice and fired at enemy trucks near Nowa Cerkiew. On 3 September, the unit fought against elements of the 6th Panzer Division near Polskie Łąki and Świecie, loosing four tankettes in total. Details on usage of cannon-armed TKS are not known, except that a commander of one of them, Cadet Adam Byrzykowski was awarded with a Cross of Valor. Another broken down cannon-armed tankette was sent to the rear on 4 September with a seized engine, after prolonged driving on sandy roads of Tuchola Forests. Possibly it was next acquired and repaired by the 71st Armoured Unit. By 6 September, the Unit's vehicles (mostly worn out TK tankettes), were in a poor shape. The unit's remaining six tankettes were sent to the rear for a reorganization (via Kutno and Warsaw to Lutsk). According to the commander's account, on 14th September the only operable tankette – a cannon-armed TKS with a truck transporter, was given to a reconnaissance unit organized by Major Stanisław Gliński in Lutsk on a basis of the 21st Armoured Unit. Its further fate is not known.
The tankettes of the 10th Cavalry Brigade contributed to quite successful delay fights of the Brigade in the first days of the campaign in Beskid mountains in southern Poland, against elements of two armoured divisions (2 PzDiv and 4 LeDiv). The Brigade's tankettes entered combat just on 1 September near Jordanów, then they fought among others near Dobczyce, Tymbark, Nowy Wiśnicz in following days. Cannon-armed tankettes were certainly responsible for some of armoured vehicles destroyed by the Polish troops, although there is a clear information only in one case, when tankettes of the 101th Company destroyed several tanks during a combat on 9 September near Albigowa, where the German advance was stopped for some time. On 15-17 September the tankettes supported Polish attack on Zboiska near Lviv, not fighting against armour however. Four surviving tankettes with cannons were withdrawn to Hungary on 19 September along with the 10th Cavalry Brigade, where they were interned and then seized by the Hungarians.
The Warsaw Armoured-Motorized Brigade fought in central and eastern Poland. Tankettes of its reconnaissance tank squadron suffered heavy losses of 6 (or 7) vehicles in combat near Lipsko on 10 September against German 15th Motorized Regiment, but it is not known whether cannon-armed ones participated in it. On 13 September tankettes of the Brigade's 11th Company took part in an unsuccessful attack on Annopol bridgehead. Cannon-armed tankettes took part in the Brigade's last three-day battle of Tomaszów Lubelski 18-20 September 1939, in which Polish units did not manage to break through a German defence towards Lviv and all armoured vehicles were eventually lost (one tankette commander Stanisław Żak was commended to be awarded a Cross of Valor).
There are known photographs of at least twelve cannon-armed TKS destroyed or abandoned in 1939, and four withdrawn to Hungary, what constitutes a majority of vehicles. Unfortunately, their identification is difficult. However, there is no doubt now, that cannon-armed tankettes were used in the 51st Armoured Unit of Krakowska Cavalry Brigade, fighting in southern Poland. A location of one widely photographed vehicle was identified as Gózd village north of Kielce, where the 51st Unit fought and suffered some losses on 6 September. In addition, its gun mantlet was recovered in a nearby farm, serving as... a lamp cover (this information was published for the first time here in 2014, thanks to Odkrywca forum participants, and the place was finally identified here in 2018 thanks to DWS forum). A presence of cannon-armed tankettes explains reports on destroying several German tanks during fighting on 1-2 September in Koszęcin – Woźniki area. It was finally confirmed in a newly revealed full report by the unit's commander Major Henryk Świetlicki, speaking about „driving away” German tanks from a battlefield with autocannon fire, and disabling two of them on 1 September by the evening[11]. J. Korbal also identified photographs of a TKS near a brick barn (a main picture on a top of the page) as taken in German field repair shop in Piasek village south of Częstochowa, which means, that it must have been lost on 1 September[11].
It was not clear, to which unit belonged a mysterious cannon-armed TKS destroyed in Tarnawatka (north of Tomaszów Lubelski), heading north on a road towards Zamość. There was a battle of Tomaszów Lubelski fought by Warsaw Armoured-Motorized Brigade, but Polish units attacked from north-west of Tomaszów and tried to break towards south. In a newest article J. Korbal put up a thesis, that it was from the 61st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company – along with the second one, near a high bank (photos on the right)[11]. Their combat usage is not known.
In a course of the campaign, tankettes with cannons were also used in the motorized-armoured group of Warsaw Defence HQ. As far as it is known, they came near the end of the siege of Warsaw only (on 20-22 September). Probably two came from the 71st Armoured Unit, because Roman Nawrocki and Edmund Roman Orlik got to Warsaw with their tankettes[note 5]. Nawrocki's tankette at least had no encounters with tanks there (although tanks were used by Germans, among others in a last assault on 26 September, after which a surrender talks started). It was believed for a long time, after Orlik's account, that there was only one such tankette in Warsaw, but lately there was revealed a photo of surrendered equipment, showing at least two, but probably even three tankettes with cannons (this information was published for the first time on our page, in 2014 update). There can't be excluded a possibility, that one or more tankette might have been taken from PZInż works, provided that peculiar vehicles from the third series had been sent there before the war for a rearmament – which is not known.
Apart from four cannon-armed tankettes of the 10th Cavalry Brigade withdrawn to Hungary, the rest were destroyed or abandoned due to damage or technical reasons during the campaign, and were seized by the Germans. There exist several photos of at least one cannon-armed tankette with German modifications, notably uncovered headlights on fenders. Details of their German service are not known, although it apparently concerned no more, than a couple vehicles (Polish tankettes were generally used by the Germans to auxiliary and security duties only, where cannons were less useful). The Hungarians impressed seven TKS in total into service, but Hungarian sources don't mention cannons as tankettes' armament.
Cannon-armed TKS were the only tankettes able to fight enemy tanks in 1939. Combining a small size with agility and firepower, they were efficient tank destroyers, as for standards of a beginning of the war at least. Of course, they were treated as reconnaissance tanks, not special tank destroyers, but some analogy seems justified – especially, that tankette companies or squadrons were not only reconnaissance element, but in practice the only armoured support available for Polish cavalry. Their bullets could pierce an armour of almost all German and Soviet tanks of that time, including newest models of PzKpfw III and IV in favourable conditions (maybe with an exception of a face hardened 30 mm frontal armour of few PzKpfw III E). Most tank combats took place on short distances due to terrain conditions, what played in a favour of 20 mm cannon. Besides, similar armament was carried by a basic German tank PzKpfw II. Only after experiences of Polish campaign (also encounters with wz. 35 anti-tank rifles), Germans started to uparmour their basic tanks with additional applique plates. Combat value of tankettes was mostly limited by their weak armour, vulnerable to all anti-tank weapons. There occurred some problems with ammunition supplies, though Orlik's account says about using captured German ammunition, and an other account suggests so indirectly (it is not clear, if they were interchangeable – Polish ammunition, despite generally modelled after long Solothurn ammunition 20x138 mm, adopted by the Germans, had longer 140 mm case, with small differences in diameter. Such possibility has not been confirmed positively so far, and is generally discarded).
As combat experience proved, rearming of tankettes was the right step. If plans had been realized, it would have allowed to double a number of armoured vehicles capable of fighting against tanks, for a relatively low cost. The rearment cost was above two-thirds of a tankette's original price, but it was still six times cheaper, than 7TP light tank, which production capabilities were limited anyway, and its armour was also insufficient. Unfortunately, in spite of early awareness of their value, the program started too late, what resulted in a small quantity of rearmed vehicles. On the other hand, thanks to undertaken efforts, a handful of cannon-armed TKS tankettes appeared just about time, in few weeks before the war. It is noteworthy, that Polish tankettes were the only such small vehicles able to fight tanks at that time – only the Italians mounted semi-automatic 20 mm Solothurn guns in their CV 33/35 tankettes, but it was only after 1940. The other thing is, that only in Poland and Italy cheap turretless tankettes, of little combat value, became a basis of armoured forces... There should be mentioned a Czechoslovak export vehicle Škoda Š-Id, armed with 37 mm gun, and French Renault AMR-35 ZT-3 with 25 mm gun, but they were bigger and were in fact self-propelled guns.
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Up and below: a series of photos of an abandoned trackless TKS with a cannon, in a village identified as Gózd, north of Kielce, on a road towards Skarżysko-Kamienna, what indicates the 51st Armoured Unit (map, street view - on right side of the road, towards north). Upper left photo - from a collection of Krzysztof Kuryłowicz. | |
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Below: a cannon-armed TKS in Tarnawatka, on a road from Tomaszów Lubelski towards Zamosc (we have identified a place on a map, and a street view - on right side of the road, towards north). The tankette probably belonged to the WBP-M brigade, although there are some doubts[note 3]. On the first photo the vehicle is still burning (destroyed or burned by the crew). Later its gun was removed and it was pushed aside. | |
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Left: a cannon-armed TKS transported by the Germans after its capture on Sd.Ah. 115 trailer. Right: a cannon-armed TKS, hauled by C4P halftrack tractor after a surrender of Warsaw (along with C2P tractor) - the same, as the first one under section "Combat use". |
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TKS with 20 mm cannon, courtesy by Thierry Vallet |
Notes:
1. There are doubts in some publications, if the 10th Cavalry Brigade received its all eight cannon tankettes, or only four, owing to a lack of documents on its actual combat complement. Most notably, Marian Żebrowski[7] wrote, that the 101st Reconnaissance Tank Company and the Reconnaissance Unit of the 10th Cavalry Brigade had only two cannon-armed tankettes each (it should be kept in mind, that it is not a definite source, an it was written outside of Poland, basing on partial reports and accounts). However, it is known, that the 2nd Armoured Battalion received 8 tankettes before the war with clear orders to give them to the 10th Cavalry Brigade during a mobilization, although the orders assumed, that four would go to the Reconnaissance Unit and four to tankette platoons in two motorized regiments, which have not been created eventually. It may be assumed, that last four were finally given to the Brigade's 101th Reconaissance Tank Company, also mobilized by the 2nd Battalion (which did not mobilize any other tankette units). The fact, that four tankettes with cannons were evacuated to Hungary may suggest, that it was their number, but on the other hand, it may be a hint, that there were initially more of them, considering a margin for combat or technical losses.
2. K. Gaj suggested in his book on the TKS[8], that four cannon-armed TKS were in the 71st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company and three cannon-armed TK-3(!) in the 81st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company, but there is no proof for it and this information was rather based on plans. It might be noted, that General Juliusz Rómmel applied for cannon-armed tankettes for the 91st and 92nd Companies of his Army.
3. The literature claims, that on 9 September the 71st Armoured Unit acquired a cannon-armed TKS in an abandoned railway transport at Jackowice. Władysław Tritt reported in his accounts (albeit without a date), that he found this TKS, being sent out to a patrol from Zduny village, then he towed it to Łowicz and gave it to a repair patrol from a "tankette company from Poznań", because his unit was not in Zduny anymore. It is not clear, because the 71st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Company (mobilized by the 1st Armoured Battalion from Poznań) fought at Łęczyca, some 40 km west, and the 72nd Company even farther. He added, that "after putting into service, the tankette took part in further combat". It is assumed, that it was used by the 71st Armoured Unit afterwards, but we don't know any first hand sources to confirm it without a doubt. It is also universally assumed, that the tankette originated from the 81st Armoured Unit – but it is not known, if it was the tankette with a broken down engine, or maybe sent back to the unit after an overhaul.
4a. According to a series of three articles written by Janusz Magnuski in 1977-1979, and repeated in a popular 1995 book "Karaluchy przeciw panzerom" (Cockroaches vs panzers), Cadet Master Corporal (plutonowy podchorąży) of the reserve Edmund Roman Orlik reportedly commanded the sole cannon-armed tankette during skirmishes at Brochów (14 September), Pociecha (18 September), Sieraków (19 September) and Warsaw defence. He claimed to have disabled three tanks at Brochów, three at Pociecha and seven at Sieraków. He claimed also, that he used ammunition taken from German vehicles, and that his tankete was the only vehicle of the 71st Armoured Unit to get through to Warsaw. Unfortunately, his accounts were not published in original form, but became a basis for Magnuski's dramatized narration on skirmishes at Pociecha and Sieraków, while Brochów and Warsaw defence were only mentioned.
However, in 1979 there was published a letter by Corporal Roman Nawrocki, in which he wrote, that he had taken command of a cannon-armed tankette in the second decade of September (after the wounded Corporal Pachocki). Nawrocki claims, that he commanded it at Brochów, immobilizing two tanks from an ambush and shooting at the third with unknown results, while Orlik commanded ordinary tankette there, in a three-tankette half-platoon. Orlik himself did not reveal any details on other tankettes' crews nor armament. Nawrocki adds, that tankettes wanted to drive closer to take bailed-out German crew as prisoners, but his canon-armed TKS ran out of ammo, and the Germans embarked their tank again. He admitted, that he had no knowledge on Orlik's later actions on 18-19 September, because he had been assigned to artillery column then. Next, they both drove their tankettes to Warsaw in one column, and Nawrocki commanded his tankette there (without encounters with enemy armour), and after the capitulation he threw out a bolt of the cannon and smashed the sight, against orders. In his memoirs from 1990, Nawrocki maintained that Orlik's tankette was still armed with a machine gun at that time. Both versions are contradictory as for the combat at Brochów only, and Nawrocki's account looks more credible here – especially, that it came in answer to articles by Magnuski, who had only mentioned this combat, without a detailed description by Orlik. However, Nawrocki could also have misremembered after 40 years what tankette Orlik had at Brochów and in Warsaw.
Still, more confusion was caused by quite detailed account by Master Corporal (plutonowy) Władysław Tritt, written down in 1968 for an award application (which we have obtained thanks to his son Lech – revealed for the first time on our page in 2018). According to him, at Brochów the platoon(?) numbered two cannon-armed and six MG-armed tankettes. While covering tankettes fording the Bzura river, Tritt disabled three tanks and repelled others, firing across the river with his cannon-armed TKS. By extension, this account leaves a place for the second cannon-armed tankette, manned rather by Nawrocki, than Orlik (unfortunately, Tritt did not write any other names either). Both accounts are diametrally different – it is possible, that they concern different parts of the combat, especially, that Nawrocki did not mention firing across the river, and tried to take prisoners. Also another soldier of the 71st Unit Corporal Kazimierz Nowakowski wrote in plural, that "our vehicles with cannons" disabled three tanks in that skirmish. A number of three destroyed German tanks at Brochów in total repeats in many secondary sources. It should be noted, that W. Tritt was awarded Virtuti Militari 5th class order in 1972, among others for participating in the skirmish near Brochów and disabling "several" tanks.
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A sketch of a skirmish at Pociecha 18 September 1939 drawn by Edmund R. Orlik[1]. It is surely not accurate, only gives a general impression. |
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A PzKpfw 35(t) (known by then as LTM-35) from Lt. von Ratibor's platoon of the 11th Armoured Regiment. A number is not clear, but it may be the commander's tank /221/ itself, destroyed at Pociecha afterwards... |
4b. Details and participants of the most famous skirmish at Pociecha in Kampinos Forest on 18 September raise doubts as well. The most known version, that Edmund Roman Orlik commanded the sole cannon-armed tankettes and destroyed three PzKpfw 35(t) tanks all by himself, acting on a personal verbal order of the brigade commander General Abraham, originates from a dramatized narration by Janusz Magnuski, basing upon Orlik's memories (see note 4a above). What is significant, the earliest article from 1977 wasn't even based directly upon Orlik's account, but upon a second-hand relation of his friend Lt. Roman Okuszko, who had heard it in 1939 during Warsaw defence. It is obvious, that Okuszko's account on events, in which he had not taken part personally, must have been distorted – however it set up basic elements for later story. Only in this first article were details given about the removal of the body of prince von Ratibor from the tank, on a request of German captives. Magnuski's works became a point of reference for other authors, hobby web pages, videos and even game makers from then on, but unfortunately did not meet a proffessional critical analysis, which would compare all existing sources.
It should be noted that Roman Nawrocki in his letter did not deny Orlik's actions on those days nor claim any participation in the skirmish at Pociecha (unless – as J. Korbal assumes – we assume that Nawrocki confuses facts in all his accounts, and when writing about the skirmish at Brochów and firing at three tanks from an ambush by himself alone (see note 4a above), he actually describes the action at Pociecha... This seems however unlikely to us, since Nawrocki knew both Orlik's mention of the skirmish at Brochów and his detailed account of the skirmish at Pociecha, yet he wrote, that he had no knowledge on Orlik's actions at 18-19 September).
In early articles, Magnuski stated that the driver of Orlik's tankette was Kazimierz Nowakowski (not to confuse with Nawrocki) – however, we believe it was only Magnuski's conclusion based on Nowakowski's account of participation in the destruction of three tanks (he had omitted the driver's name in later book). According to his account, which we learnt in 2024, Cadet Corporal Nowakowski from 11 September became the commander of the tankette squadron commander's post (probably commanding his tankette, when the commander did not do it personally). He confirms the fact that three tanks were destroyed by tankettes near Pociecha, but unfortunately does not mention any names of the participants. The laconic narrative in his otherwise detailed report suggests that Nowakowski took part in the clash, but it is not known in what role (description of the entire action: "we surprise the Germans from a distance of about 150 m. Such a direct distance allows us to completely destroy these three tanks"). Therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be ruled out that he was actually a driver. Regardless of whether he took part in the skirmish himself, he was undoubtedly a participant of last actions of the unit. What is important, his report indicates that all three tankettes had cannons, because before the action the Poles drained the rest of the petrol from vehicles and divided it "among 3 TKS with NKM". According to him, however, immediately after the skirmish at Pociecha the tankettes ran out of petrol and had to be abandoned after dismantling the weapons.
It might be found peculiar, that M. Żebrowski in his "Zarys historii polskiej broni pancernej" (History outline of Polish armoured weapons), written in London in 1971, basing upon partial documents, reports and accounts of Polish soldiers in exile, does not mention Orlik's name at all in a chapter describing the 71st Armoured Unit (it might have been connected with a fact, that Orlik was NCO of the reserve, less known to pre-war cadre). According to Żebrowski's book, at Pociecha there fought the 1nd platoon commanded by Lt. Bronisław Kalinowski (at that time he was already appointed the tankette squadron commander), and there participated: Cpl. Władysław Tritt, Cpl. Stanisław Pachocki and Master Cpl. Mieczysław Łopatka... It might be noted, that already on 28 September the latter two were awarded the Cross of Valour for their actions in the campaign.
What is more, long before Orlik's version, already in 1964, Master Corporal Władysław Tritt had described a skirmish at Pociecha in a letter to Polish authorities, then in 1966 in a letter to one newspaper, and in 1968 in an award aplication. He claimed constantly, that there had been three cannon-armed tankettes present at Pociecha, and he had disabled two tanks personally, while the third had been destroyed alltogether. It is significant, that in 1972 Władysław Tritt was awarded with the highest Polish military order of Virtuti Militari 5th class, and an application, in which he described skirmishes at Brochów and Pociecha, was signed by the tankette squadron commander of the 71st Unit B. Kalinowski and the deputy commander of the 71st Unit Kazimierz Rose, and approved by Gen. Abraham - the commander of Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade. Therefore, this version may be regarded as officially established (it was described on our page in 2018, for the first time to wider public, thanks to help of Władysław's son Lech Tritt).
In his accounts W. Tritt described, that it was not an ambush, but a meeting engagement from a distance of several dozen meters, in which Polish tankettes were sent into the forest and got under a fire. He took up a firing position behind a large anthill, partly covering the tankette, then hit and set two tanks on fire. Before that, the second tankette had overtaken him, and the third had driven into a pit and could not take up a position so quickly. This version does not exclude however, that the second tankette could have fired at the same targets. Tritt could not have fired at the third tank immediately because of a need to change position and turn right. He further stated, that the uhlans pulled up an anti-tank gun and placed it next to the tankettes, but when it was taking up a position, the third tank began to withdraw towards the Poles, and overturned the cannon with its rear when making a turn. Then, it was "fired jointly by all of us until it caught fire". Unfortunately, Tritt did not mention any other names, except Pachocki, who was the only casualty, slightly wounded by a splinter (it should be noted, that Roman Nawrocki claimed, that he got the cannon-armed tankette after Pachocki had been wounded around 10 September – maybe he was hurt twice, or it was a mistake in one of the accounts. It is worth expressing regret by the way, that in most of the accounts, their participants do not mention the names of their crew members and all colleagues who took part in the battles...). According to all Tritt's accounts, German captives shouted, that "their general" remained in a burning tank, and a general's coat was found inside, what he associated later with an information on a death of General Werner von Fritsch. This is unbelievable as far as the general's death is concerned, however it is worth noting that the description itself is identical to Orlik's account according to Okuszko, about Germans telling, that "their captain" remained in the tank.
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For an illustration purpose, LTM-35 knocked out evidently by Polish 37 mm anti-tank guns, probably at Sieraków on 19 September. |
On the other hand, Polish cavalry officers gave different versions of the battle of Pociecha, emphasizing the role of Uhlans' 37 mm Bofors anti-tank gun and anti-tank rifles wz.35 in destroying German tanks, but also showing a wider context. In particular, Major Kazimierz Chłapowski, commanding the 15th Uhlan Regiment, reliably reported the circumstances of the battle, that the tankette platton was assigned by Gen. Abraham to his regiment, which was marching in the brigade's vanguard towards Warsaw. According to him: "At about 3:30 p.m. in the forest near the crossroads (200 meters east of the crossroads), in a small clearing, the vanguard came across 3 enemy tanks and 4 motorcycles. A violent fight ensued. All three tanks were burning, the crew of two jumped out with terrible burns, and the crew of the third died, unable to get out. The prisoners claim that there was a commander in that tank, a German prince. One tank was destroyed by an anti-tank gun. Uhlan 2nd class Furman disengaged the gun under fire and calmly aimed, allowing the tank to get within 100 meters before firing a valuable shot. Uhlan 2nd class Furman came from Łódź, from a Jewish family. The remaining tanks were destroyed by fire of anti-tank rifles and our tankettes, which quickly found themselves in direct positions. It was a really nice cavalry episode, noteworthy for the quick decision and orientation of the commanders of both squadrons of the vanguard - Capt. Władysław Mackiewicz and Bronisław Buszkiewicz. Unfortunately, it was after this action that the regiment commander had to issue an order to destroy the equipment of the TK platoon. It became useless due to lack of petrol". Major Chłapowski was rather not an eyewitness, but he should have a knowledge from reports. It was probably on this basis that General Abraham wrote in his memoirs, that Uhlan 2nd class Adam Furman with an anti-tank gun "ignited and destroyed a tank approaching him directly with a precise shot from the closest distance. The TKS platoon and our reliable anti-tank rifles destroyed two more tanks. The tank crews burned to death. Among the dead was identified the commander of the platoon, Leutnant Prinz von Ratibor". Incidentally, some of German sources state that the platoon had four destroyed tanks - which would allow to reconcile the "claims" of the anti-tank gun and the tankettes. M. Żebrowski also wrote about the platoon with four tanks, three of which were destroyed by tankettes.
It is interesting to note, that there survived an account of the German bow gunner of the platoon commander' tank Wilhelm Heidkamp. He noticed one tankette firing from a distance of 100 m, and an anti-tank gun position. According to him, von Ratibor got out of the tank, but died from a wound in the abdomen afterwards, while the driver was killed by a machine gun fire while leaving the tank. Heidkamp himself was wounded and dragged out from the tank, while a gunner was intact. He mentioned, that three people from the second tank, and the entire four-person crew from the third died. This indirectly indicates that the tanks and their crews were also fired at with machine guns by the cavalry.
To sum up: in our opinion, there is no doubt that three cannon-armed tankettes took part in the skirmish near Pociecha, commanded by Władysław Tritt and probably Stanisław Pachocki and Mieczysław Łopatka – or Orlik, and there was a 37 mm anti-tank gun active as well. However, it is difficult to assess to what extent the participants of the skirmish contributed to the unquestionable destruction of three LTM-35 tanks, especially considering that they could have fired at the same targets, and not every hit with a 20 mm shell disabled a tank. The participation of Orlik in the skirmish cannot be ruled out, but Magnuski's version about his single-handed destruction of three tanks is surely a myth, unfair for other Polish tankers. On the one hand, it seems little likely that Orlik would have completely baselessly attributed his participation in the battle, especially since he told Okuszko about it already during the siege of Warsaw, but it cannot be ruled out either. The argument against Orlik's participation in the skirmish, which is difficult to explain in any other way based on the knowledge we have, is that according to the above-mentioned credible accounts, the tankettes were abandoned without fuel after the skirmish at Pociecha – and yet Orlik fought at Sieraków the next day, and then undoubtedly took the tankette to Warsaw...
It should be emphasized that Orlik told his version to Magnuski more than ten years after Tritt's public letters, almost 40 years after the events described (which additionally encourages distortions), and after Gen. Abraham's death (in 1976). There is a plausible possibility, that Orlik could have "modified" his memories, in order to conform with what Roman Okuszko had remembered from Orlik's wartime stories (heard in Warsaw in 1939!), and had told Magnuski. Orlik himself could have previously "embellished" his actions during the campaign in private conversations without consequences, and it is obvious that Okuszko further distorted details of the story he had heard, after so many years. By that time the skirmish was not widely known, and it was not even known whether other participants were alive, so Orlik could have attributed to himself an independent "ownerless" victory, especially since such a version had already appeared in print thanks to Okuszko and Magnuski... Magnuski on the other hand might have not wanted to change the published story much, when he learnt details directly from Orlik – or he thought, that it was more interesting to create a tank ace, than to split a hair upon details. It is regrettable that instead of accurately citing Orlik's account and attempting to establish the actual course of the battle and its participants, Magnuski included another dramatized description of the battle... Finally, it should be noted, that Orlik was awarded with Virtuti Militari 5th class order in 1979, but it was ilegally invested by a self-proclaimed "president of free Poland in exile" Juliusz Nowina-Sokolnicki, apparently after Magnuski's articles. There was also set up a stone memorizing Orlik's destruction of "PzKpfw III" tank in an alleged place of the battle (or rather in its vicinity).
4c. It may be surprising, that nobody except Orlik claims to have taken part in a battle off Sieraków on 19 September. However, from among authors of known accounts, Tritt and Nowakowski had to abandon tankettes after they ran out of fuel the previous evening, while Nawrocki was assigned to protect an artillery column. Paradoxically, if Orlik did not take part in the battle of Pociecha the previous day, it increases a probability that he fought at Sieraków, as other part of the 71st Armoured Unit. On the other hand, there are no other possibilities to verify this story (and even the fact, that Orlik had a cannon-armed tankette then). The fact that General Abraham threw tankettes into the fight is generally confirmed by an account of Capt. Zbigniew Szacherski from the 7th Mounted Rifles Regiment, without details though. German tanks of the 1st Leichte Division suffered high losses there against defence of Polish uhlans, supported by 7th Mounted Artillery Unit and anti-tank guns (including LTM-35 of Hauptmann von Kriegsheim, a company commander of the 65th PzAbt, and the PzKpfw IVB of Feldw. Hähnert, mistakenly regarded as von Ratibor's tank).
Orlik's dramatized description is included only in works of Janusz Magnuski mentioned in note [4a] above. It is noteworthy, that Orlik shown Magnuski the battlefield at Sieraków personally. According to Orlik, he was still supported by two tankettes TK-3 with machine guns and during short raids from a pit he claimed to have immobilized seven tanks. He even claimed, that he ordered two prisoners of war on the battlefield to mount onto his tankette, and brought them to Polish positions (!). Of course, names of other crewmen are in his story unknown. All in all, a number of 7 tanks immobilized by a single tankette is most probably overestimated, considering well-known tendence to overestimate enemy losses – especially in a view of limited Orlik's credibility (see notes 4a and [4b] above). It is however possible that he could have actually disabled several tanks (provided, that he had a cannon armed TKS indeed).
5. It is probable that two tankettes with cannons from the 71st Armoured Unit reached Warsaw, of Orlik and Nawrocki. Nawrocki consistently mentioned, that these two tankettes got to Warsaw as only vehicles from the 71st Armoured Unit – but he maintained, that Orlik's tankette was armed with a machine gun. Orlik claimed on the other hand, that he drove his cannon-armed tankette to Warsaw (as the only surviving vehicle from the 71st Armoured Unit). A possession of a cannon-armed tankette in Warsaw by Orlik was confirmed to Magnuski by both Orlik and Okuszko (who could have seen it by himself). However, the presence of two, and probably even three cannon-armed tankettes in Warsaw is documented by a photograph. It should be remembered, that three tankettes with cannons were disarmed and left by their crews after the battle of Pociecha without a fuel [see note 4b]. According to W. Tritt's account, on 22 September he broke through to Warsaw (without equipment), but he claimed, that four tankettes (of an unknown model) were repaired in Warsaw, "whose crews were in a happier position, having the opportunity to stock up on captured petrol" – the context suggests that they were from the 71st Unit. It should be noted that in Warsaw there were already ordinary tankettes with machine guns from the Armoured Weapons Training Centre, forming a company of the Warsaw Defence Command, reinforced with the remnants of the 91st and 31st Independent Reconnaissance Tank Companies. There can't be excluded a possibility, that one or even more tankettes with cannons might have been taken from PZInż Ursus works in Czechowice near Warsaw, provided that peculiar vehicles from the third series had been sent there before the war for a rearmament, and they were not sent to other units, such as WBP-M brigade.
Sources:
1. Janusz Magnuski: Karaluchy przeciw panzerom; Pelta; Warsaw 1995
2. Leszek Komuda: Przeciwpancerne tankietki in: "Militaria" Year 1 Nr. 3 and Nr.
3a. Janusz Magnuski: W walce z pancerną nawałą in: "Za Wolność i Lud" 39/1977
3b. Janusz Magnuski: Orlik atakuje pierwszy in: "Za Wolność i Lud" 20/1978
3c. Janusz Magnuski: Bój pod Sierakowem in: "Za Wolność i Lud" 39/1979
4. Leszek Komuda, Norbert Baczyk: Niszczyciel czołgów po polsku in: "Nowa Technika Wojskowa" special issue 6 (3/2009).
5. Rajmund Szubański: Polska broń pancerna w 1939 roku; Warszawa 2004
6. Mirosław Zientarzewski: Przeciwpancerne tekaesy in: "Militaria i Fakty" 2/2006.
7. Marian Żebrowski: Zarys historii polskiej broni pancernej, London 1971
8. Krzysztof M. Gaj: Czołg rozpoznawczy TK-S, Warszawa 2013
9. Rajmund Szubański: Pancerne boje wrzesnia, ZP Grupa, 2009
10. Janusz Ledwoch: Tankietki TK-3/TK-S 1939, Wydawnictwo Militaria nr 321, Warszawa 2009
11. Jędrzej Korbal: Enkaem 20 mm – śladami legendy, in: "Technika Wojskowa Historia" special issue 4/2023.
12. Jędrzej Korbal: Enkaem 20 mm – szansa dla broni pancernej, in: "Technika Wojskowa Historia" 4/2023.
Photo source not indicated - mostly assorted photographs taken by German soldiers, or Polish official pre-war photographs.
History:
Main page – Polish armour – Polish artillery – Steel Panthers
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Text copyright: Michal Derela © 2007-2024.